In 1989, Adi Shamir [15] proposed a new zero-knowledge identication scheme based on a NP-complete problem called PKP for Permuted Kernel Problem. For a given prime p, a given matrix A and a given vector V , the problem is to nd a permutation π such that the permuted vector V π veries A · V π = 0 mod p. This scheme is still in 2011 known as one of the most ecient identication scheme based on a combinatorial problem. However, we will see in this paper that it is possible to improve this scheme signicantly by combining new ideas in order to reduce the total number of computations to be performed and to improve very eciently the security against side channel attacks using precomputations. We will obtain like this a new scheme that we have called SPKP. Moreover, if we use precomputed values in the scheme SPKP, then the prover will need to perform no computations (i.e. only selection and transmission of precomputed values). This is very interesting for security against side channel attacks because our scheme is zero-knowledge and we don't perform any computations using the key during the identication so we prove that any attacker (even using side channel attacks) being successfully identied implies that he has a solution to the NP-complete problem PKP.
Introduction
The articles published on PKP after Adi Shamir's article of 1989 focussed on the study of various attacks on PKP. In 1992, Georgiades [5] introduced symmetric polynomials equations. The symmetric polynomial equation of degree 1 is very useful and will be used by every other attacks. The symmetric polynomial equations of bigger degrees seems to be very dicult to exploit though. The same year, Baritaud, Campana, Chauvaud and Gilbert [1] attacked PKP using a time-memory trade-o. In 1994, Chauvaud and Patarin [2] combined the previous attacks and used a few new ideas. In 1997, Poupard [13] created a program to nd the best attack's parameters improving the previous techniques. In 2001, Joux ( [8] ) used a new time-memory trade-o technique, dividing equations in 4 parts, to further improve the attack. However, these attacks didn't break Shamir's PKP scheme : they are all exponential and PKP is still very ecient. For example, the best attack known from Joux [8] is in 2
106
. Nevertheless, they show that the initial parameters of Shamir PKP (16, 32) are too weak, specially with today's power computation.
Some articles (Girault [6] , Courtois [3] ) compared the PKP scheme with other identication scheme like CLE [17] [18] and SD [16] from Stern, PPP [12] from Pointcheval and MQ [14] from Sakumoto/Shirai/Hiwatari. These papers show that PKP scheme is one of the most ecient in terms of computations needed and bits transferred. In this article, we will try to describe variants of PKP that could make it even more ecient. It seems like this subject has not been studied so far. In fact, as we will see, the simplest variants don't give very good results. In this way, we could say that Shamir's PKP scheme seems quite "stable". Nevertheless we will see that, combining some simple ideas, we can create a scheme, named SPKP, that seems to be really more ecient. . For each permutation σ ∈ S n , we note V σ the vector dened by V σ = (v σ(i) ) i and A σ the matrix dened by A σ = (a i,σ(j) ) i,j . We can notice that, for each permutation σ, we have A σ R σ = AR. Given a prime p, a matrix A and a vector V , the Permuted Kernel Problem is to nd a permutation π such that A.V π = 0 mod p.
This problem is NP-complete and has many advantages to be used in an identication scheme. Indeed, the following identication scheme is Zero-Knowledge (the prover doesn't reveal anything about the secret during the identication), it uses very basic operations (multiplications mod p), it is very fast and it diers from many other schemes by not depending of the factorisation or discrete log problem. Since the problem is NP-complete, it is expected to be secure against quantum computers (unlike schemes based on factorisation or discrete log). The identication scheme is the following :
PKP 5 rounds identication scheme [15] The users agree on a matrix A and a prime p. Each user chooses a random vector W in Ker(A), a random permutation π and computes V = W π −1 . The public key will be V and the secret key will be π. V has been dened such that V π is in Ker(A). Each user can now prove their identity by proving they know π :
1. The prover chooses a random vector R and a random permutation σ. The prover computes the hashed values of (σ, A.R) and (πσ, R σ ) and sends both of them to the verier. 2. The verier chooses a random c ∈ Z/pZ and sends it to the prover. In the rst case, the verier checks that the hash of (σ, A σ W ) is equal to the hash of (σ, AR).
In the second case, the verier checks that the hash of (πσ, W − cV πσ ) is equal to the hash of (πσ, R σ ).
An honest prover is obviously passing the test successfully : in the rst case, we verify that
In the second case, we verify that
As shown in [15] , the scheme is Zero-Knowledge and the probability of success for someone who doesn't know π is less or equal to . This is the rst constraint. Now, we have to care about security. The naive attack is to choose the rst n − m coordinates of the vector V π (using the coordinates of V ) and use the m equations to nd the last m coordinates. The complexity of this naive attack is n! m! . We need n to be big enough so that n! m! is big enough, this is the second constraint.
Later, we will use the best known attack from Joux but in the next sections, we'll only need the naive attack to understand that the simplest variants are not ecient.
Shamir proposed to use p = 251 (the largest prime number on 8 bits) so that we can use the scheme on small devices like 8 bits microprocessors of smart cards. This is a good choice and we'll see in section 5 if we can choose other values for p (for example for 32 or 64 bits processors, are larger values of p more ecient ?). Considering the two constraints, values of n and m were proposed : P KP (16, 32) (which gives a security in 2 46 against the best known attack at present and therefore is not sucient) and P KP (37, 64) (which gives a security in 2 106 against the best known attack).
Performances
Let's count how many multiplications we need to do in the identication scheme.
The matrix is A is public so everyone can use Gauss elimination so we can assume A is given by A = [A |I] where A is a m × (n − m) matrix and I is the m × m identity matrix.
The prover has to compute A.R at step 1 and c.V πσ at step 3. This is m × (n − m) + n multiplications of 8bits numbers and the same number of additions. For PKP (16, 32) , after 31 rounds, this is 2
14.1
operations (half of them are multiplications). For PKP(37, 64), after 31 rounds, this is 2 16 operations. This is very fast compared to many other schemes.
In each round, we send two hashed values (128 bits for both), one vector (8n bits) and one permutation (log 2 (n!) bits). For P KP (16, 32), after 31 rounds, this is 2 There are many issues in using p = 2. The rst one is that we don't have n! dierent possible solutions anymore because there are many equal coordinates.
The best way to keep many dierent solutions is to set V with n/2 zeros and n/2 ones, that way we have n! (n/2)! 2 dierent possibles solutions. Moreover, we found another problem with p = 2 : if two public keys V 1 and V 2 have the same number of ones and zeros, the user knowing π 1 can compute π 2 and inversely. The proof is in the appendice 13.1. This limits the number of possible keys to n + 1 at best but most of them are weak. 2<p<251 : For those values of p, we have the same problems that we had with p = 2. It's dicult to build public keys with dierent coordinates and there is a limited number a possible public keys (specially for small values of p). All the details are in the appendice 13.1
Why p > 251 improve the number of operations needed but not the transmissions
Nowadays, we have access to 32 and 64bits processor so we could use those to compute modulo prime numbers of 32 or 64 bits. Therefore it is rather natural to consider PKP on computers (instead of 8 bits smartcards) with values of p of 32 or 64 bits instead of p = 251 (8 bits). As we will see, we will improve like this the number of computations (but not the number of transmissions). The equation n! ≈ p m tell us that, using 4 or 8 times more bits for p, divides m by 4 or 8. We know that all the attack heavily use those m equations (for example, the naive attack is in n!/m!). Let see in the next array some parameters, the corresponding Joux's attack complexity and the number of multiplications mod p needed. We can notice that the extra equation of degree one of Georgiades [5] is used here in Joux attack and is not negligible when p is large. We made dierent arrays for the various ranges of attack's complexity (cf appendice 13.2 for more details). 
6 Second variant : 3 rounds PKP (instead of 5 round PKP)
We found an identication scheme with 3 rounds (instead of 5) based on the PKP problem :
PKP 3 rounds identication scheme 1 . The prover chooses a random vector R and a random permutation σ. He sends 4 hashed values :
2. The verier sends a challenge b = 1, 2 or 3.
3. If b = 1, the prover reveals σ and
If b = 2, the prover reveals σ and
If b = 3, the prover reveals σπ and W 3 = R σ . The verier veries that H(W 3 + V σπ ) = h 2 and H(W 3 ) = h 4 .
Theorem :
An honest prover will pass the test successfully all the time while a dishonest prover has, at best, a probability 2 3 to pass the test successfully. Indeed, if someone can answer to the 3 questions then he has a solution for the PKP problem. Proof : Let σ 1 , W 1 , σ 2 , W 2 , σ 3 and W 3 be the answers to the 3 possible questions. Since the attacker is accepted for each questions, we have the following system :
Supposing that the H functions are secure, we have :
Replacing W 1 in the second equation by (W 2 ) σ1 +V σ3 (using the fourth equation), we have :
Since A σ1 ((W 2 ) σ1 ) = AW 2 and V σ3 = (V σ −1 1 σ3 ) σ1 , this implies that :
which is equivalent to AV σ Considering this probability, we need 52 rounds to have a 2 −30 impersonation probability. Theorem : The PKP 3-rounds scheme is Zero-Knowledge. Proof : There are 3 dierents answers. If b = 1, we reveal σ and R σ so we don't reveal anything about the secret π. If b = 2, we reveal σ and R + V π , the secret V π is not revealed because R is random so R + V π is random. If b = 3, we reveal σπ and R σ but, again, σ and R being random we don't reveal anything about π.
About performances, we need to compute AR and R σ + (V π ) σ at step 1. This is m(n − m) multiplications and m(n − m) + n additions. About transmissions, there are 4 hash (256 bits), one vector (8n bits) and one permutation (log 2 (n!) bits). 7 Third variant : using more vectors and some symmetry in the PKP problem
What happens if we use more than one vector V i.e. with l ≥ 2 vectors V instead of l = 1 ? This is the exact same thing to consider V as a matrix of size m × l. If we increase the number of vectors, we have to decrease the number of equations m (because n! ≈ p m·l ) which should increase the attack complexity. Here we will explain why l = m (the maximal possible value for l) is not more secure than l = 1 (they actually have the exact same security, using a symmetry argument). However, in section 8 we will see that l = √ m is indeed interesting because, in this situation, there is an equal number of equations and vectors which is the xed point of the following symmetry :
Theorem (Symmetry in PKP) : Given a prime p and an integer n, solving the PKP problem with m equations and l vectors has the exact same complexity that solving the PKP problem with l equations and m vectors. Proof in Appendice 13.5. As said before, decreasing m increase the attack's complexity but it slightly increase the number of operations needed as well. Using p of 8, 16, 32 or 64 bits didn't lead to interesting results. But, surprisingly, using p = 2 and multiple vectors permits to decrease the number of operations as we will see in the next part.
Part III -SPKP : our new PKP variant
Our new idea : With one vector, as we have seen above, we couldn't use low prime numbers. However, with multiple vectors, we noticed that it is now possible to use low prime numbers and we will see that it can be interesting to consider p = 2. As long V doesn't have two equal lines, there are n! possibilities for π.
Denition
Our new scheme SPKP combines the three previous ideas :
3 rounds (instead of 5 for PKP). p = 2 (instead of p = 251 for Shamir's PKP recommended parameters). multiple vectors (typically l = 9 instead of l = 1 for PKP). impersonation probability. We need to compute the best parameters n, m and l for SPKP and we'll see the number of additions needed and conclude on its potential eciency. To nd those parameters, we have to analyze how SPKP is resisting to the best attack known. This is the object of the next section.
9 Attacks and Eciency of SPKP SPKP is NP-complete because PKP is NP-complete and PKP is a particular case of SPKP. SPKP is Zero-Knowledge, the proof is exactly the same we gave for PKP 3 rounds. We think that all existing attacks are less ecient on SPKP. Indeed, for given values n and p, we have the equation
where m is the number of equations and l is the number of vectors. If we use l vectors instead of 1, we have to divide the number of equations m by l and every attacks are very much dependent of the number of equations m. The best attack on SPKP seems to be, as far as we know, similar to the best attack on PKP such as Joux's attack [8] . It'd be too long and complicate to describe the Joux's attack there. We adjusted it to SPKP by taking p = 2, changing n−vectors in n×l−matrix and numbers (in the D i sets) in 1×l−vectors.
In the next arrays, we present the PKP parameters and the SPKP parameters with the corresponding attack's complexity and the number of computations needed for a 2 −30 impersonation (31 rounds for PKP and 52 rounds for SPKP). Nowadays, recent smart cards use 32 bits microprocessor so we combined bits operations together to divide the number of operations needed. This results shows that SPKP needs less and simpler operations so it seems to be more ecient than the original PKP scheme. For a 2 100 security, SPKP needs 12 times less operations than PKP and all operations are additions compared to PKP using multiplications and additions. Now, we will compare SPKP with other combinatorial schemes. In this array, we'll show bits operations for SPKP instead of combining them and we give the number eld used as well. We used parameters for a 2 This shows that SPKP is the scheme using the less operations (if we combine bits operations together).
Parameters Security 32 bits operations
Moreover, using precomputations, we can make this scheme even more ecient as we will see in the next section.
Precomputations with SPKP or our PKP 3-rounds
In the original PKP scheme (5 rounds, presented at section 2), the prover has to compute W = R σ +cV πσ where c is a value with p possibilities (p = 251 typically) chosen by the verier then he will face one of the two challenges. Therefore, for the 31 rounds, if the prover want to precompute all the possible answers to the prover questions in advance, he has to prepare 62p answers, approximately 15000 values. This is not very realistic. However, in our scheme (PKP 3 rounds, section 6), the verier will face one of the three challenges at each round. Therefore, for the 52 rounds, the prover has to prepare 104 answers for one identication. This is realistic if we use devices with enough memory. Therefore, we see that all the prover's computations can be precomputed so that the prover doesn't have to compute anything during the identication. We can create a smart card which contains only the datas R i , h 1 , ..., W 1 , .... The prover uses this card for identication, his only need is to send and receive datas from the verier. Precomputation with other combinatorial schemes This property is possible on every other schemes as long the number of possible challenges is limited. This is why our scheme is ecient for precomputation : there are only 3 possible challenges while the standard PKP has 502 possible challenges. The memory needed for one identication is the number of bits for transmission times the number of challenges.
In We see that SPKP is one of the most ecient scheme if we want to use precomputation. In 2004, Samsung realised a smart card with 256kbytes of EEPROM which permits to save datas for about 16 identications using SPKP. In the next few years, the memory size augmentation could permit to create smart cards with more than a thousand of identications saved.
11 Security against side channel attacks
Since a few years, very ecient physical attacks have been discovered on smart cards and microprocessors, for example : timing attacks, power attacks (SPA, DPA [9] ), fault attacks (DFA), ... Generally some ways to x those problems was found by the scientic community, but sometimes it is really dicult to design secure hardwares against some physical attacks, and it is expected that new attacks could be found. A lot of those attacks use the fact that the microprocessor has to manipulate secret datas. In the variants of PKP 3 rounds and SPKP that we presented, it is possible to precompute everything. That way, no secret datas are manipulated by the microprocessor which greatly simplies the security against physical attacks. The precomputed datas have to be encrypted or saved in protected areas because, even if a single data doesn't reveal anything about the secret, the combination of some datas could reveal the secret. The microprocessor needs to be able to transmit one of those values but not all of them and eventually decrypt this value with a key K. The other values have to be encrypted with dierent keys or saved in protected areas to assure a good security. In fact, it seems to be much easier to secure such a scheme from physical attacks than to secure the traditional schemes that manipulate a secret data s in the computation of an identication against physical attacks (where s needs to be still secret after the identication). That's why we think those schemes present a real interest for the security against physical attacks. We compared SPKP with other schemes that use precomputations like GPS [7] or Lamport [10] and his variants. We give more details in appendice 13.3.
Conclusion
In this article, we studied simple variants of PKP. Using one idea alone doesn't give good results but, surprisingly, combining 3 ideas creates a more ecient scheme. Those 3 ideas are : 1. to change the characteristic to 2, 2. to use multiple vectors and 3. to use a 3 rounds scheme instead of 5 rounds. As far as we know, it is the rst time that a simple 3 round variant of PKP (instead of 5 rounds of [15] ) is described. Moreover, all the computations can be precomputed so that the prover doesn't have to compute anything during the identication i.e. he needs only to select some precomputed values and send them. Since no secret value is used or loaded on the micro-processor during this identication this property might be very useful for security against the side channel attacks. This may be really interesting since side channel attacks are often much more ecient than algorithmic attacks for practical security. Typically if two stored and precomputed values are given the secret may be found but only one of this value will be given, in a zeroknowledge way. We can notice that this property is much more ecient on our 3 round variant of PKP and SPKP than the previous classical 5 round variant.
Why small values of p are inecient
There are many issues in using p = 2. The rst one is that we don't have n! dierent possible solutions anymore because there are many equal coordinates. The best way to keep many dierent solutions is to set V with n/2 zeros and n/2 ones, that way we have n! (n/2)! 2 dierent possibles solutions. Moreover, we found another problem with p = 2 : if two public keys V 1 and V 2 have the same number of ones and zeros, the user knowing π 1 can compute π 2 and inversely. The proof is in the appendice. This limits the number of possible keys to n + 1 at best but most of them are weak. Indeed, this user just need to compute the permutation σ which sends V 2 to (V 1 ) π1 ∈Ker(A) (this permutation exist because V 2 and V 1 have the same coordinates). That way, we have (V 2 ) σ = (V 1 ) π1 so
